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Against the Grain: The North Dakota
Wheat Pooling Plan and the
Liberalization Trend in World
Agricultural Markets
Jon Lauck
Government intervention in world agricultural markets fig-
ured prominently in twentieth-century international economic
relations. The nineteenth-century trend toward relatively free
global markets, symbolized by the repeal of the British Corn
Laws, was reversed as the twentieth century saw unparalleled
government intervention.' Now, on the cusp of a new century,
one ushered in with talk of an integrated, global marketplace,
international free trade agreements and international organiza-
tions police free trade and limit the ability of policymakers to
1. See D.N. MCCLOsKEY, ENTERPRISE AND TRADE IN VICTORIAN BRITAIN:
ESSAYS IN HISTORICAL ECONOMICS 155, 157, 159 (1981) (table 8.1, Net imports,
tariff collected and tariff rates, 1841, 1854 and 1881 (E thousand)) (indicating
that the value of British wheat imports grew 446% from 1841 to 1881 when "the
commercial policy of the United Kingdom moved decisively from fettered to free
trade"). See also Leslie A. Wheeler, Government Intervention in World Trade in
Wheat, 1 J. OF WORLD TRADE L. 379 (1967) (discussing the degree of interven-
tion by governments).
Before World War I international trade in wheat averaged around 25
million tons a year. Of this quantity, on the export side, virtually none
was subject to direct intervention by the governments of the exporting
countries. On the import side, almost one-half was free of intervention
by the governments of the exporting countries. In 1966-67, world trade
in wheat amounted to over 60 million tons. All of it was subject to
varying degrees of intervention by the governments of both exporting
and importing countries. (emphasis added)
Id. See also D. GALE JOHNSON, WORLD AGRICULTURE IN DIsARRAY 251 (1973)
(discussing the history of agricultural trade).
The only major nation that adhered to free trade in farm products for
an extended period of time since the 15th century was the United
Kingdom and then for rather less than a century. The abolition of the
British Corn Laws in 1846 did herald a period of nearly free trade in
farm products in Western Europe, but the period was a brief one of two
or three decades. War (the Franco-German War of 1870) and the great
depression of the last quarter of the nineteenth century induced a re-
turn to protection.
Id.
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advance proposals which interfere in global markets. Policy-
makers must now consider the consequences of government ac-
tions affecting free trade. Carefully considering different policy
approaches is critically important, given the growing number of
complaints by American farmers who feel swindled by global
markets 2 and a political atmosphere increasingly hostile to free
trade.3
2. See Farmers Want Cork in Imports, FORUM (Fargo N.D.), Apr. 8, 1994.
This article quotes a North Dakota farmer testifying to the International Trade
Commission regarding Canadian imports into the United States:
If this commission refuses to take action and stop the dumping on U.S.
markets then U.S. farmers will have no choice but to take matters into
their own hands ... The farmers' next tactic would be to imitate
French farmers and block U.S. road and railroad entrances from Can-
ada with manure. U.S. farmers will not sit by and let these outrageous
trade agreements bankrupt our farms.
Id. See also Don Davis, Schafer Won't Join S.D. Inspection of Canadian Trucks,
BISMARCK TRIB., September 10, 1998, available in LEXIS News Library (noting
the "proposal by South Dakota's governor to stop Canadian trucks in retaliation
for what officials in the Dakotas consider unfair trade."); Farmers Unleash An-
ger at GOP, DES MoiNEs REG., Sept. 21, 1998, available in 1998 WL 3226907
(describing a farm rally where farm-state Democrats contended "U.S. trade pol-
icies fail to protect farmers from unfair policies in Canada and other nations");
A Spontaneous Protest By Farmers in Montana Jolts the Wheat Trade, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 2, 1994, at Al (describing another farm protest); A.V. Krebs, Farmers
Beware of GATT, DES MoiNEs REG., Nov. 27, 1994, at C1 (demanding more
study and public discussion before the congressional vote on GATT); George
Anthem, Nafta Divides Farming Groups; The Split Generally Pits More Liberal
- and Smaller - Agricultural and Rural Activist Groups Against Giants of the
Industry, DES MoiNEs REG., Sept. 17, 1993, at 1 (enumerating the farm groups
who doubted the benefits of free trade during the NAFTA debate: "Joining the
Farmers Union in questioning NAFTA are the National Farmers Organization,
the National Family Farm Coalition, Union Milk Marketing Cooperative,
American Agriculture Movement, Rural Coalition, Federation of Southern Co-
operatives and Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy"). But see Ag Officials
Back NAFTA Pact Vital to Future Health of U.S. Farmers, DES MOINES REG.,
Nov. 10, 1993, at 4 (noting that "Nine former agriculture secretaries and forty-
two heads of state departments of agriculture Tuesday endorsed the NAFTA,
saying it is vital to keeping food production in the United States from entering a
long period of stagnation and possible decline").
3. See The Trade Talk Gets Ugly, Bus. WK., Nov. 23, 1998, at 56; See also
Nancy Dunne, Common Ground Elusive as Clinton Seeks Trade Unity, FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 22, 1999, at 7 (explaining grassroots disenchantment with trade
pacts).
This has been made worse by the fact that the old free trade coalition
in Congress has eroded as every election since the end of the Cold War
has seen the departure of older free traders and the election of trade
skeptics. An NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll, conducted last
month, found 58 per cent of Americans believe trade has been bad for
the US economy, compared with 32 per cent who said it had resulted in
economic growth. In a CNN/Gallup poll in October, 47 per cent said
the North American Free Trade Agreement had been 'bad' for the
country and 52 per cent opposed negotiating similar pacts elsewhere.
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Such sentiments have given rise to a North Dakota proposal
to involve state government in the coordination of wheat pool-
ing. To relieve economic distress among farmers, the North Da-
kota Farmers Union (NDFU) has advanced pooling as a method
of improving farm marketing by collectively organizing commod-
ities in order to receive higher prices for farm goods.4 Farmers
will enjoy enhanced prices either because of the market power
gained through pooling or the economies of scale and enhanced
efficiency resulting from the marketing of a larger quantity of
farm goods.5 To strengthen the pool, the NDFU has also advo-
cated a coordinated effort with the Canadian Wheat Board,
which collects the wheat grown by Canadian producers. 6 Coor-
dination with Canada, the Farmers Union argues, will enlarge
the quantity of wheat controlled by the pool and thereby in-
crease its market power, ultimately giving farmers greater bar-
gaining power. 7
Id. See also Eyal Press, The Free Trade Faith: Can We Trust the Economists?
LINGUA FRANCA DeciJan. 1998, at 30 (noting that "much of the country opposed
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), [making] ... free trade
among the most talked-about, polarizing issues in U.S. politics" and reviewing
the academic debate over free trade); Alison Mitchell, By a Wide Margin, House
Votes Steel Import Curbs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1999, at Al (explaining House
passage of a bill limiting steel imports which "displayed the division in the
Democratic Party over Clinton's free trade policies as well as the appeal of pro-
tectionism to Republicans from Rust Belt states"); Richard W. Stevenson, The
Trade Squabble; Contentious Issue that Casts Spotlight on Frictions of a
Shrinking World, N.Y.TIMES, April 11, 1999, at A12 (detailing Congressional
doubts about free trade and the Clinton administration's failure to finalize a
trade agreement with China); WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE WORLD, READY OR NOT:
THE MANIc LoGic OF GLOBAL CAPITALIsM (1997) (outlining concerns about the
social impact of economic globalization).
4. See Wheat Marketing Pool Plan Unveiled, BIsMARK TRn., Aug. 5, 1998,
available in LEXIS, News Library.
5. See Won W. Koo, D. Demcey Johnson, Joon Park, Richard D. Taylor,
Economic Analysis of the Proposed North Dakota Wheat Pool: A Preliminary
Report 21, 21-25 (no date) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the North Da-
kota Industrial Commission). This article explains that
[a] market pool is an arrangement by which producers market their
crops collectively. A marketing organization, typically a cooperative, is
charged with selling its members' production. Marketing functions are
performed by a specialist or professional staff. Sale proceeds and mar-
keting costs are combined in a single account, and net revenues are
divided among producers (members) at the end of an agreed period.
Id.
6. See Dakota Pride Pool, Proposal presented by Robert Carlson, North
Dakota Farmers Union President, Press Conference, Tuesday, Aug. 4, 1998, at
1.
7. See id. NDFU noting that Itihe Canadian prairie provinces are our
major competitor for spring wheat and durum markets. If we can reach an
1999]
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The North Dakota proposal presents itself at an inauspi-
cious time. The Agreement on Agriculture (the Agreement) that
resulted from the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations
counteracted the century-long inclination to intervene in agri-
cultural markets.8 The Agreement established various obliga-
tions to reduce government intervention in agriculture. 9 In
hope of advancing the Uruguay Round's progress toward free
trade in agricultural markets, the WTO has planned agricul-
tural talks for late 1999 as part of the preparation for the "mil-
lenium round" of trade negotiations.10 Given the changing
nature of the free trade debate in the United States and the
growing opposition to GATT and NAFTA, a review of the dilem-
mas inherent in liberalizing the global agricultural trade seems
appropriate."1 Such a review reveals the painfully slow progress
toward agricultural trade liberalization in recent years and
sheds light on the potential success of the newly-proposed wheat
pool.
Part I of this Note reviews past government efforts to coor-
dinate and manage agricultural markets and the problems asso-
ciated with each of these efforts and examines the role of GATT
and its efforts to reduce high levels of government interference
in agricultural markets. Part II outlines the North Dakota pro-
posal to build an effective wheat pool and analyzes potential
problems in light of the history of government intervention.
This Note concludes by reviewing the challenges faced by the
wheat pooling proposal, noting its incompatibility with the free
trade agenda embraced by many farm groups and recom-
mending a continued search for other solutions to farmers' eco-
nomic distress.
agreement with them, we will eliminate a competitor and be able to obtain a
higher price for wheat and durum on both sides of the border." Id.
8. See Louis Lorvellec, Back to the Fields After the Storm: Agriculture in
the European Union After the Uruguay Round Agreements, 2 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L.
411, 413 (1997) (explaining that "the legal framework of international agricul-
tural commodity markets and of internal agricultural policies has been deeply
altered by the conclusion of the UR").
9. See Agreement on Agriculture, opened for signature Apr. 15, 1994, in
WTO, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY RoUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIA-
TIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTs 39, (1995) [hereinafter Agreement].
10. See Deborah McGregor, Call for New Round of World Trade Talks
Likely to Head Agenda, FIN. TiMEs, Jan. 20, 1999, at 4. See also Guy de Jon-
quieres, Back on the Fast Track, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1999, at 11 (noting the
WTO's commitment to negotiating on agriculture and the momentum provided
by the Clinton administration).
11. See Amy Borrus, et al., Change of Heart; The U.S. Is Having Doubts
About the World Trade Pact It Championed, Bus. WK., May 20, 1996, at 48-49.
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I. PAST GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO CONTROL THE
AGRICULTURAL TRADE
Import restrictions on agricultural products increased dra-
matically in the 1920s.12 In response to the Great Depression in
the 1930s, the federal government adopted sweeping programs
to support farm income through direct payments and to increase
prices through restrictions on production. 13 Post-World War II
free trade agreements exempted American agriculture in order
to protect the domestic pricing regime from foreign competi-
tion.14 Efforts to liberalize agricultural trade throughout the
postwar negotiating rounds generally failed until the finaliza-
tion of the Uruguay Round in the early 1990s. 1 5 The debates
and dilemmas over such efforts to manage the agricultural trade
present several warning signals for the development and appli-
cation of the North Dakota wheat pooling plan.
A. THE COMING OF THE POST-WORLD WAR II AGRICULTURAL
ORDER
In the 1920s, in response to agricultural groups' demands
for tariff protection equivalent to the protection afforded other
industries and in response to the post-World War I farm crisis,
three different Presidential administrations extended trade pro-
tections. 16 Farmers felt angry about the double standard ap-
plied to tariff policy. While industrial America enjoyed high
tariffs offering protection from foreign competition, agricultural
commodities were subject to the whims of the international
market.17
To complement his efforts to coordinate and stabilize the do-
mestic agricultural system and protect it from disruption
through high tariffs, Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover ad-
vanced similar plans for global commodity markets. Hoover and
12. See DAVID B. DANDOM, BORN IN THE COUNTRY: A HISTORY OF RURAL
AMERICA 189 (1995).
13. See id. at 209-11.
14. See David R. Purnell, 1993 International Trade Update: The GATT and
NAFTA, 73 NEB. L. REV. 211, 218 (1994).
15. See id. at 212-15.
16. See EDWARD S. KAPLAN, AMERICAN TRADE POLICY, 1923-1995 1-20
(1995).
17. See generally Joan Hoff-Wilson, Herbert Hoover's Agricultural Policies,
1921-1928, in HERBERT HOOVER AS SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 1921-1928: STUD-
IES IN NEW ERA THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 115,116-44 (Ellis W. Hawley ed., 1981)
(evaluating Hoover's efforts to find a solution for the farm problem of the
1920s).
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others viewed the sugar market, for example, as disastrously
unstable and therefore in need of progressive government coor-
dination.' 8 The American market included more than just conti-
nental producers of cane and beet sugar: it also included Cuba
(which had a tariff exemption after 1902), Hawaii, Puerto Rico,
and the Philippines, which were American territories. 19 Like
other markets after World War I, the sugar market was ex-
tremely unstable. 20 In 1923, for example, Cuban sugar sold for
over five cents a pound on the New York market, but by 1929,
the price had dropped to less than two cents. 21 As a result, Hoo-
ver encouraged the sugar producers to invoke his associational
plans for a self-governing, cooperative arrangement to reduce
production and boost prices. 22 Like Hoover's domestic stabiliza-
tion programs, the effort to coordinate sugar production ulti-
mately failed due to a lack of cooperation, and for most of the
early 1930s sugar sold for about one cent a pound.23
Although Hoover sought to balance and order markets
through state-encouraged, voluntary cooperative action, he gen-
erally wanted market forces to shape economic activity. He be-
lieved a largely free economy was necessary for continued
American economic growth and prosperity. 24 In the case of the
global rubber market, Hoover believed that the American econ-
omy suffered from a lack of competition and free trade.25 He
thus promoted State Department efforts to coordinate the in-
vestment of American corporations in overseas rubber planta-
18. ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE GREAT WAR AND THE SEARCH FOR A MODERN
ORDER: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THEIR INSTITUTIONS, 1917-
1933, at 183-86 (2d ed. 1992).
19. See GEORGE W. STOCKING and MYRON W. WATKINS, CARTELS IN ACTION:
CASE STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DIPLOMACY 22 (1946).
20. See Edward G. Cale and Oscar Zaglits, Intergovernmental Agreements
Approach to the Problem of Agricultural Surpluses, 34 IOWA L. REV. 230, 236-38
(1949).
21. See Stocking and Watkins, supra note 19, at 28.
22. Ellis W. Hawley, Herbert Hoover, the Commerce Secretariat, and the
Vision of the "Associative State," 1921-1928, 61 J. AM. HIST. 116, 116-40 (1974).
23. See Stocking and Watkins, supra note 19, at 39. The failure of the plan
led to state intervention during the New Deal. See id. The Sugar Act of 1937
established national quotas for the different sugar producing regions in the
United States. See id. Also, similar to the case of wheat, an International
Sugar Agreement was established in 1937 and an International Sugar Council
was created to manage the overproduction problem. See id.
24. Hawley, supra note 18, at 83-89.
25. Joseph Brandes, Product Diplomacy: Herbert Hoover's Anti-Monopoly
Campaign at Home and Abroad, in HERBERT HOOVER AS SECRETARY OF COM-
MERCE 1921-1928: STUDIES IN NEW ERA THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 186, 197 (Ellis
W. Hawley ed., 1981).
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tions to undermine the British-sponsored Stevenson rubber
cartel.26 The State Department organized that cartel in re-
sponse to a price plunge from sixty cents per pound in 1918 to
twelve and one-half cents per pound in 1922, a reduction similar
to that in the sugar market.27 Hoover, however, saw the rubber
cartel not as a stabilizing effort similar to his sugar plan, but as
an effort to gouge or "super-charge" the American consumer.28
When rubber prices surged to $1.20 in 1925, Hoover whipped up
anti-foreign monopoly sentiment, created support for private
sector buying pools, and promoted business efforts to create al-
ternative sources of rubber. 29 Hoover launched similar cam-
paigns against foreign cartels in coffee, oil, and potash.30
Hoover's failure to boost sugar prices highlights the problems
inherent in government attempts to build market power in in-
ternational agricultural markets, and his success at undermin-
ing the rubber cartel demonstrates the potential for retaliatory
action by foreign governments.
Hoover gave his greatest attention to the domestic organiza-
tion of core agricultural commodities such as wheat. As Hoover
saw it, agriculture depended too heavily on unstable and unreli-
able foreign markets and should isolate itself, taking advantage
of America's "remarkably self-contained" economy and concen-
trating on coordinating domestic production with domestic
demand. 3 ' However, the voluntary, federated agricultural coop-
eratives that he envisioned would manage this process failed to
coordinate production properly, setting the stage for state-man-
dated acreage reductions under the New Deal's Agricultural Ad-
justment Act (AAA).32
Hoover's unwillingness to use state power stymied one of
the decade's largest efforts by farmers to boost prices artificially.
The McNary-Haugen bill, twice vetoed by President Coolidge
and vehemently opposed by Hoover, would have forced the fed-
26. Id. at 198. See David Kilroy, Extending the American Sphere to West
Africa: Dollar Diplomacy in Liberia, 1908-1926 (1995) (unpublished Ph.D. dis-
sertation, University of Iowa) (on file with University of Iowa Libraries); JO-
SEPH BRANDES, HERBERT HOOVER AND ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE POLICY 1921-28, at 68 (1962) (noting that "The struggle against for-
eign combinations aroused wide national interest").
27. See Brandes, supra note 25, at 197.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 198-208.
30. Id. at 187-96 (describing Hoover's anti-monopoly campaign).
31. DAVID E. HAMILTON, FROM NEW DAY TO NEW DEAL: AMERICAN FARM
POLICY FROM HOOVER TO ROOSEVELT, 1928-1933, at 110 (1991).
32. See id. at 216-36.
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eral government to establish two prices for agricultural com-
modities-a high domestic price to aid farmers and a price low
enough to allow dumping on the world market.33 Foreign gov-
ernments resented such efforts to protect domestic agriculture, a
fact quickly recognized in the post-World War II period. Hoo-
ver's unwillingness to engage in state-sponsored dumping, his
inability to stabilize global commodity prices (such as rubber,
wheat, sugar, and coffee), and his failure to raise domestic agri-
cultural prices contributed heavily to his electoral defeat in 1932
and, unwittingly, to the construction of the postwar agricultural
order.34
In response to the agricultural crisis of the 1930s and in
contrast to Hoover's failed voluntary cooperative efforts, Presi-
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt's AAA designated a national allot-
ment of key commodities, paid farmers to produce within the
limits of the allotment, and thereby increased prices through ar-
tificial scarcity.35 To prevent the price support system from be-
ing overwhelmed, the legislation included protections from
foreign competition, angering Cuban sugar and Canadian wheat
producers, among others. 36 Specifically, Section 22 of the AAA
authorized import quotas or fees, and Section 32 authorized ex-
port subsidies on wheat, which were used continuously from the
end of the Korean War until the large-scale Russian grain sales
of the 1970s.37 The agricultural program angered trading part-
ners and conflicted with the diplomatic efforts of the State De-
partment, sparking bitter clashes between Secretary of State
Cordell Hull and AAA director George Peek over the Reciprocal
Trade Agreements Act.38
33. See generally GILBERT C. FITE, GEORGE N. PEEK AND THE FIGHT FOR
FARM PARITY 169-184 (1954)(explaining support for and passage of the McNary-
Haugen bill). See also Hawley, supra note 22, at 137.
34. HAMILTON, supra note 31, at 195-236.
35. See MURRAY R. BENEDICT, FARM POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES, 1790-
1950: A STUDY OF THEIR ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 302-15 (1953).
36. The Secretary of Agriculture was responsible for determining if imports
would undermine the farm program. See id.
37. See Wheeler, supra note 1, at 386.
38. See PETER B. KENEN, GIANT AMONG NATIONS: PROBLEMS IN UNITED
STATES FOREIGN ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY 79 (1960); LLOYD C. GARDNER, Eco-
NOMIC ASPECTS OF NEW DEAL DIPLOMACY 24 (1964). See also Elaine Fuller,
American Wheat: From Surplus Production to Export Promotion, 1945-1975, at
17 (unpublished conference paper, presented at the Social Science History Asso-
ciation Conference, November 1995). This paper argues that the
[p]ostwar debates over agricultural price supports recognized the im-
portance of expanding agricultural exports but basically the issue was
ignored.... What seemed to be emerging was a struggle between pro-
ponents of economic nationalism, represented by the system of farm
296 [Vol. 8:289
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During the early years of the New Deal, representatives of
the Roosevelt administration also participated in an economic
conference in London which addressed government-sponsored
international commodity agreements establishing minimum and
maximum world prices for products. 39 One of those agreements,
the International Wheat Agreement (IWA) of 1933, involved
nine exporting nations and thirteen importing nations. 40 The
exporting nations were to reduce acreages fifteen percent, and,
in exchange, importing countries agreed to limit their acreages
and lower tariffs in order to stabilize prices.4 1 The agreement
quickly fell apart when Argentina exceeded its quota after a
bumper crop, but the remnants of the program helped shape the
postwar international agricultural trade.42 The fragments of
earlier farm policies-the domestic production control/price sup-
port policies of the AAA, the attempt at international coopera-
tion to coordinate and stabilize the global wheat trade, and
agriculture's exemption from increasingly stringent rules gov-
erning world trade-combined after World War II to shape the
structure of the international agricultural order.
B. POST-WORLD WAR II AGRICULTURE AND GATT
In the 1940s, many world leaders considered the economic
nationalism of the interwar years as partly responsible for
World War II.4 3 As Secretary Hull argued, "if goods can't cross
borders, soldiers will."44 The ensuing trade negotiations in Ha-
vana in 1947 led to an agreement to reduce world tariff levels
and to establish both the International Trade Organization
(ITO) to police trade disputes and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), all of which led to tariff concessions
price supports (whether rigid or flexible), income payments, tariffs and
subsidies, in opposition to an internationalist position, the latter now
represented by supporters of the State Department's strong position on
creating a global multilateral free trade system.
Id.
39. See Colleen M. O'Connor, Going Against the Grain: The Regulation of
the International Wheat Trade from 1933 to the 1980 Soviet Grain Embargo, 5
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 225, 238 (1982).
40. See id. at 239.
41. See id.
42. See CARMINE NAPPI, COMMODITY MARKET CoNTROLs: A HISTORICAL RE-
VIEW 37-47, 63 (1979).
43. See THoMAs W. ZEILER, AMERICAN TRADE AND POWER IN THE 1960s, at
21-24 (1992).
44. Id. at 23.
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on two-thirds of the world's trade.45 Due to the influence of agri-
cultural interests, however, agriculture was afforded exemptions
from the GATT rules banning import quotas.46 GATT rules gov-
erning subsidies were also weakened to accommodate agricul-
ture.47 The ITO, continuously jeopardized due to American
fears of an institution that could undermine agricultural sup-
port programs, ultimately failed to gain approval from the U.S.
Senate. 48 Additionally, given cold war priorities such as the re-
construction of Western Europe as a bulwark against the Soviet
Union, the United States also agreed to permit regional trading
blocs, undermining the trade reciprocity principles of GATT and
ultimately allowing the creation of arrangements such as the
European Union's Common Agricultural Policy.4 9 In 1955, the
45. See generally, SUsAN ARIEL AARONSON, TRADE AND THE AMERICAN
DREAM: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF POsTwAR TRADE POLICY 79-132 (1996) (explaining
the demise of the ITO).
46. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multi-
lateral Trade Negotiations, Annex II, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RE-
SULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), Art. XI:2(c)
(allowing "[ilmport restrictions on any agricultural or fisheries product").
47. See Jon G. Filapek, Agriculture in a World of Comparative Advantage:
The Prospects for Farm Trade Liberalization in the Uruguay Round of GATT
Negotiations, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 123, 138 (1989)
Originally, the General Agreement only required subsidizing nations
to notify the GATT of the 'extent... nature ... estimated effect of the
subsidization ... and of the ... circumstances making the subsidiza-
tion necessary.' The current version of Article XVI, the subsidies regu-
lation, retains this notification requirement and bans subsidies on
nonprimary products that result in the sale of the product at lower
than the domestic price. Primary products may be subsidized, but not
as a means for the state to acquire more than an 'equitable share of
world export trade' in that product. 'Equitable share' is not defined in
Article XVI, although export market share in the product during 'a pre-
vious representative period' and any 'special factors' affecting trade in
a product will be taken into account.
Id. (quoting General Agreement, art. XVI).
48. See Henricus A. Strating, The GATT Agriculture Dispute: A European
Perspective 18 N.C.J.INT'L L. & COM. REG. 305, at 307, 311 (1993) "During the
negotiation of the Havana Charter, the U.S. delegation recognized that the
United States Senate would not ratify an international agreement that would
force the U.S to dismantle or suspend its agricultural programs." Id. See also
Aaronson, supra note 45, at 81. "[The United States had not reconciled its new
trade policy with its long-standing agricultural programs. This inconsistency
was nothing new: 'Agricultural protection was the rock on which some of the
best ... interwar efforts to reduce trade barriers were wrecked.'" Id. (quoting
Brookings Institution study).
49. See Strating, supra note 48, at 327. The United States demand for ag-
ricultural exemptions from the GATT "gave the EC the opportunity to establish
the CAP without seriously violating GATT customs and practices." Id.
[Vol. 8:289
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United States received a GATT waiver offering relief from the
already weak rules governing agricultural import quotas. 50
Agriculture's exemptions from GATT earned it a reputation
as "the problem child of world trade."51 The powerful interests
that demanded exemptions from GATT rules and contributed to
many international political disputes have also, unsurprisingly,
generated a great deal of international legal activity. In the
1950s, twenty-three percent of GATT cases involved agriculture;
however, from the early 1960s to the late 1980s, over fifty per-
cent of GATT cases resulted from agricultural trade disputes.52
Due to the controversial nature of the agricultural trade, liberal-
ization efforts accomplished little during most of the post-World
War II period. Indeed, seven of the first eight rounds of GATT
focused on manufacturing, not agriculture. 53 The great costs of
government intervention in the farm trade, however, made agri-
culture an urgent agenda item during the Uruguay Round.5 4
This renewed interest ultimately produced the Agreement on
Agriculture, reversing the long-term tendency of governments to
interfere in agricultural markets and limiting the ability of pol-
icy-makers to pursue proposals such as the North Dakota Farm-
ers Union wheat pooling plan.5 5
50. See Filapek, supra note 47, at 137. The author states:
The United States requested this waiver when Congress passed farm
legislation in conflict with GATT obligations, including an amendment
to Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. The provision, as
amended, required the executive branch to restrict agricultural im-
ports that interfered with the operation of domestic farm programs
notwithstanding any 'trade agreement or other international agree-
ment heretofore or hereafter entered into by the United States.' Given
the United States' determination to carry out the Congressional man-
date, the Contracting Parties granted the waiver, believing that a re-
fusal would damage the GATT system by forcing the United States
either to defy GATT principles openly or to withdraw from the GATT
altogether.
Id.
51. Jeffrey J. Steinle, The Problem Child of World Trade: Reform School for
Agriculture, 4 MiNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 333, 335 (1995).
52. See Robert Hudec et al., A Statistical Profile of GATT Dispute Settle-
ment Cases: 1948-1989, 2 MiNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 67 (1993).
53. See Steinle, supra note 51, at 342.
54. See Filapek, supra note 47, at 162 (explaining that the pressures lead-
ing to the Uruguay Round reforms increased since the "costs of supporting agri-
culture [had] escalated and the benefits of trade liberalization [had] become
more apparent").
55. See Agreement, supra note 9.
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C. POST-WORLD WAR II COMMODITY AGREEMENTS
Despite earlier failures, or perhaps because of them, in 1947
and 1948 negotiators attempted to stabilize world agricultural
prices and limit international competition through another In-
ternational Wheat Agreement (IWA). 56 This IWA took effect in
1949 and lasted four years. 57 The exporters in the agreement
(Australia, France, Canada, and the United States) guaranteed
a supply of grain to importers (roughly forty countries) in ex-
change for the assurance that the importers would buy a fixed
supply. 58 The agreement established a price range, applicable
to a fixed amount of wheat, above which the exporters could not
sell and below which the importers could not buy.59 However,
since the amount of wheat provided for in the agreement ac-
counted for less than half of the world's annual wheat trade
(thirty-seven percent of American exports in total), prices con-
tinued to fluctuate.60
Other factors also undermined the agreement: the refusal of
Argentina and the Soviet Union to join; the abandonment of the
agreement by the world's largest importer, Great Britain, after
the negotiation of a new agreement in 1953 (British negotiators
thought the new price maximum of $2.05 was too high); and,
unlike the 1933 agreement, the absence of domestic production
controls which could stem the entry of new products into the
market. 61 The negotiators weakened the 1959 IWA when they
deleted the requirement that importers buy a fixed quantity of
wheat and instead required them to buy a quantity based on a
percentage of their total imports, resulting in the importers' use
of substitutes and in greater self-sufficiency. 62 In 1962, the IWA
ended the requirement that domestic agricultural policy support
the integrity of the IWA, giving exporters and importers "com-
plete liberty of action" to develop domestic agriculture programs,
a far cry from the production control requirements of the 1933
IWA.63
56. See O'Connor, supra note 39, at 240.
57. See id. at 241.
58. See Wheeler, supra note 1, at 392 (noting that the amount to be ex-
changed was fixed according to an annual quota schedule).
59. See O'Connor, supra note 39, at 240.
60. See id.
61. See Cale and Zaglits, supra note 20, at 234-35.
62. See O'Connor, supra note 39, at 242.
63. Id. at 240, 242. See also Stanley Metzger, Cartels, Combines, Commod-
ity Agreements and International Law, 11 TEx. INT'L L. J. 527, 535-36 (1976)
(explaining increased restrictions on commodity cartels in the postwar years).
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In the late 1960s, in spite of the problems associated with
previous efforts, policy-makers attempted another international
agreement to stabilize and coordinate the wheat market. 64 This
resulted in the International Grains Agreement of 1967 (IGA).6 5
By the time the IGA took effect in 1968, however, the pricing
agreements had been overwhelmed by that season's large har-
vests.66 Unable to unload massive surpluses at the minimum
price established under the IGA, major exporters such as Can-
ada and France willfully violated the agreement, and the United
States argued that the minimum price arrangement was only a
"guideline."67 In 1971, the Wheat Trade Convention re-con-
vened, but no agreement could be reached on purchase or supply
obligations or pricing structure. 68 An attempt to negotiate an-
other agreement in 1978 also failed. 69 The extreme difficulties
involved in coordinating international commodity markets, even
with the aid of governments, underscore the problems of manag-
ing global agricultural markets. The inability of nations to coop-
erate and the ability of additional producers to enter the market
make any such efforts tenuous.
D. PUBLIc LAw 480 AND THE STATE TRADING PROBLEM
In the early 1950s, political leaders were still searching for
the best way to manage the agricultural surplus. The limited
amount of sales organized under the IWA, the shrinking Mar-
shall Plan sales to Europe, the ending of the Korean war and its
extraordinary demand for farm goods, and the chronic stockpil-
ing of USDA commodities complicated their efforts.70 With the
64. See O'Connor, supra note 39, at 246.
65. See id. at 247 (noting that the Agreement was called grains instead of
wheat because prices were pegged to several different varieties of wheat instead
of just one prominent variety, Manitoba No. 1).
66. See Liaquat Ali, The World Wheat Market and International Agree-
ments, 16 J. WORLD TRADE L. 59, 66 n.1 (1982).
67. See O'Connor, supra note 39, at 249.
The language of the International Grains Agreement led some major
exporting countries, notably the United States, to believe that cutting
prices below the specified minimum did not violate the agreement. By
the summer of 1969, barely a year after the International Grains
Agreement became effective, the minimum prices remained only tech-
nically in effect because the major exporting countries ignored their
existence.
Id.
68. See Ali, supra note 66, at 67.
69. See O'Connor, supra note 39, at 263.
70. See Fuller, supra note 38, at 19 (noting that during the first quarter of
1949, when the Marshall Plan was fully operational, it financed 83 percent of
American corn exports and 67 percent of wheat flour).
1999]
MIN. J GLOBAL TRADE
election of Dwight D. Eisenhower to the Presidency in 1952, the
farm policy emphasis of previous decades shifted.7 ' The new
Secretary of Agriculture, Ezra Taft Benson, promoted "freedom
to farm" and emphasized the importance of exporting.7 2 To in-
crease exports, Secretary Benson advocated scaling down Amer-
ican surpluses through government-aided sales and donations to
other countries.7 3 The legislation that was enacted, known as
the Agricultural Trade Development Act of 1954, or simply Pub-
lic Law 480, significantly altered the nation's ability to manage
its commodity surplus problem.74 The law allowed the Eisen-
hower administration to negotiate the sale of $700 million in
surplus government stocks for foreign currency over three years
and funnel the money back to the purchasing country for eco-
nomic development. 75 In addition, $300 million could be dis-
posed of via contributions to humanitarian or famine relief
efforts. 76 The program became a "free gift" to needy countries
that would otherwise have had to spend their foreign exchange
on food or "do without."77 By the late 1950s, one-third of Ameri-
can economic aid would take the form of these local currency
sales, and seventy percent of wheat exports would be handled by
the program. 78 By 1962, half of soybean oil exports were made
under P.L. 480. 79
The absence of international rules governing agricultural
trade and surplus problems in other countries fostered the exist-
ence of P.L. 480-type programs and state-trading in other coun-
tries. All Canadian grain exports, for example, were sold by the
71. See generally Robert Griffith, Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Corporate
Commonwealth, 87 AM. HIST. REV. 87, 107 (1982) (explaining reduced govern-
ment support for agiculture).
72. Robert L. McGeorge, Accomodating Food Security Concerns in a World
of Comparative Advantage: A Challenge for GATT's International Trade Sys-
tem, 71 NEB. L. REV. 368, 388 (1992) ("Starting with the enactment of PL-480,
Congress gradually began to rely more upon market-oriented policies and the
expansion of markets for U.S. agricultural products to assure adequate farm
incomes"); EzRA TAFT BENSON, FREEDOM TO FARM 229-30 (1960).
73. See generally TRUDY H. PETERSON, AGRICULTURAL ExPORTS, FARM IN-
COME, AND THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION 24-32 (1979) (explaining the em-
phasis on export promotion).
74. See Agricultural Trade Development Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-480, 7
U.S.C. § 1701(a); Wheeler, supra note 1, at 387.
75. See Peterson, supra note 73, at 42.
76. See id.
77. See JACOB J. KAPLAN, THE CHALLENGE OF FOREIGN AID: POLICIES,
PROBLEMS, AND POSSIBILITIES 50-51 (1967).
78. Don Paarlberg, Essentials of Modern Trade Policy, in READINGS IN AG-
RICULTURAL POLICY 233, 235-36 (R. J. Hildreth ed., 1968).
79. See id.
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Canadian Wheat Board, whose mandate was "[tlo market as
much grain as possible at the best price that can be obtained".
Similarly, Australian grain producers marketed their commodi-
ties through the Australian Wheat Board.80 Such nationally-
based state-trading programs, however, created the potential for
clashes between nations, as evidenced by the battle over the Ira-
nian market in the postwar years. In the latter part of the
1960s, ninety-five percent of soybean oil exports were subsidized
by P.L. 480. During that time, Iran was an important export
market and was threatened when the Soviet Union began dump-
ing sunflower oil. 8 ' A generous counteroffer of P.L. 480 credit
preserved the Iranian market for the United States.8 2 The same
strategy prevented Australian and Canadian wheat from dis-
placing American commodities in subsequent years.83
The history of such rivalries makes cooperation between
North Dakota producers and the Canadian Wheat Board, a core
component of the wheat pooling plan, unlikely, especially given
the legacy of bitter agricultural disputes between the United
States and Canada.8 4 Canada has taken a strong stand in re-
cent trade disputes, alleging violations of both NAFTA and WTO
agreements by the United States. 5 U.S. Senator Byron Dorgan
of North Dakota has been extremely critical of a recent agricul-
tural accord between the United States and Canada, claiming
that Canada continues to violate international agreements and
drive down American farm prices, thereby fueling border clashes
80. See Alex F. McCalla and Andrew Schmitz, Grain Marketing Systems:
The Case of the United States versus Canada, AM. J. OF AG. ECON. 204 (May
1979); MICHAEL J. McGARRY and ANDREW SCHMITZ, THE WORLD GRAIN TRADE:
GRAIN MARKETING, INSTITUTIONS, AND POLICIES 333-34 (1992).
81. See DAN MORGAN, MERCHANTS OF GRAIN 176 (1979).
82. See id. at 176-77.
The Iranian market was not one that the U.S. Soybean-oil industry
was prepared to surrender.... [American officials] drew up an action
plan for retaking the Iranian market with offers of P.L. 480 loans....
By 1975, total Iranian purchases of the American soybean oil reached a
record $117 million. The Soviet Union's sunflower oil disappeared
from army kitchens, homes, and restaurants, and the American soy-
bean was once again king.
Id.
83. See id. at 177; McCalla and Schmitz, supra note 80, at 204-09.
84. See Attention Washington: The Wheat Belt Is Not Impressed, CONGRESS
DAILY, Jan. 8, 1999.
85. See Heather Scoffield, Ottawa Tackles U.S. on Farm Blockade; Turns to
NAFTA, WTO about Grain, Cattle and Hog Exports to South Dakota, other
States, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Sept. 25, 1998, at B5.
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and dimming the prospects of greater U.S.-Canadian trade
cooperation.8 6
E. THE PROBLEM OF THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY
(CAP)
After making no progress on the agricultural front during
the Dillon Round, negotiators placed great emphasis on agricul-
ture during the Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations in the
early 1960s.8 7 If European tariffs could be cut by fifty percent by
1970, American negotiators believed, American livestock exports
could increase by thirty-four percent and crop exports by
twenty-one percent over 1961 levels.88 Without a successful
tariff reduction, the Kennedy administration feared that a pro-
posed unified European agricultural policy would exclude Amer-
ican farm products. This policy ultimately came to be known as
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), a regime which em-
ployed variable levies to exclude less expensive foreign agricul-
tural goods, resulting in privileged status for such products as
French wheat, Italian rice, and Danish dairy products-all to
the exclusion of American commodities.8 9
From 1959 to 1968, when the CAP was in place, European
protection levels rose dramatically: for meat, from 19 to 52 per-
cent; for dairy, from 19 to 137 percent (from 30 to 350 percent for
butter); for cereals, from 14 to 72 percent.90 From 1966 to 1969,
American agricultural exports to the EEC that were subject to
the levies of the CAP tumbled nearly fifty percent.91 According
to the Farm Journal, by the end of the Kennedy Round, which
86. US., Canada Ease Farm Trade Tensions Along Border, WASH. POST,
Dec. 5, 1998, at G1; U.S. Canada Reach Pact on Grain and Livestock, But
Protestors Vow to Block Border Anyway, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 5, 1998, at D10,
"[Slome militant farmers and their champion, Sen. Byron Dorgan, D-N.D., de-
nounced the deal for failing to restrict Canadian imports, which they blame for
driving down grain and meat prices. A farm-protest organizer said a border
blockade ... in four states [would] go ahead as scheduled." Id. See also Canada
Trade Pact Fails to Mollify, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1998, at C1 (noting the "long-
standing problem with Canada").
87. See Zeiler, supra note 43, at 170-73.
88. See Memorandum from Willard W. Cochrane, senior agricultural advi-
sor, to Orville Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture, Subject: Economic Conse-
quences of the Kennedy Round (Jan. 7, 1964) (located in file folder 1964 W.W.
Cochrane memoranda (1), document box 11, 144.K.8.5(B), Orville Freeman Pa-
pers, Minnesota Historical Society).
89. See Zeiler, supra note 43, at 170.
90. See H. B. Malmgren and D. L. Schlechty, Rationalizing World Agricul-
tural Trade, 4 J. OF WORLD TRADE L. 515, 517 (1970).
91. See id.
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lasted from 1964 to 1967, "[tlhe much-advertised fight that the
administration was going to put up for U.S. farmers ended in
almost complete capitulation."92
The infamous "chicken war" perhaps best exemplifies the
U.S.-EEC commercial rivalry of the period.93 From 1929 to 1961
the output of American chickens grew fifty-fold, and from 1948
to 1964 prices dropped from $.35 to $.14 lb.; as a result, poultry
exports surged. 94 American poultry exports to Europe, totaling
only $3.6 million in 1958, grew to $53.5 million by 1962. 9 5 The
booming American exports, however, fell victim to the CAP in
1962, specifically regulation 22, which outlined plans for a com-
mon market in poultry meat.96 By 1963, American poultry ex-
ports were nearly cut in half.97 The crisis became so acute that
President Kennedy wondered whether the "Grand Alliance
[was] going to founder on chickens."98
The Kennedy administration presented its case under
GATT and promised, if case negotiations failed, to seek retalia-
tory trade measures. 99 The New York Times wondered whether
the EEC was on the brink of becoming an "inward-looking, high-
tariff club," and argued that the answer would determine the
"future shape and even the fate of the Atlantic Community."100
The journalist C.L. Sulzberger mused that if the United States
was denied access to the EEC market, "the Whole Grand Design
for NATO defense, interdependence and a tightening Western
comity of nations could scatter like feathers in a hen-house." 10
Members of the U.S. Senate introduced a resolution asking the
American delegation in Geneva to preserve access to American
export markets. ' 0 2 The negotiations began with an American of-
fer to participate in a non-obligatory arbitration conducted by a
GATT Panel.'0 3 The Panel ultimately concluded that the EC
had violated GATT rules with its restrictive policies, but it also
92. Farmers and the Kennedy Round, FARM J., June 1967, at 74.
93. See generally Ross B. TALBOTr, THE CHICKEN WAR: AN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY, 1961-64, at 3-4 (1978) (describing the rivalry as "chicken war").
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 30-37.
97. See id. at ix.
98. Id. at 56.
99. See id. at 100.
100. See TALBOTT, supra note 93, at 84.
101. Id. at 96.
102. See id. at 94.
103. See id. at 111.
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ruled that the resulting economic damages were substantially
less than the United States claimed. 10 4 The United States and
the EC accepted the conclusions of the Panel and implemented
its recommendations, averting a full-fledged trade war.105 The
episode highlights the complexity of the international agricul-
tural trade, the level of state interference in the trade, and the
geopolitical concerns surrounding it. It also underscores the
dangers of brinksmanship and the ease with which a trade war
can be triggered in the volatile international agricultural sector.
In the early 1980s, another GATT Panel approved EC flour
export subsidies, and the U.S. Deputy Special Trade Represen-
tative commented that the decision "introduces the law of the
jungle" into the agricultural trade.' 0 6 The United States then
subsidized a large sale of flour to Egypt, which triggered angry
EC condemnations of the "brutal [American] takeover" of the
Egyptian market.' 07 German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich
Genscher informed Secretary of State George Schultz that the
sale could damage U.S.-EC relations; British Foreign Minister
Douglas Hurd worked to "keep the arguments on agricultural
trade under control so they don't produce damaging political re-
sults"; a French trade official concluded that "[wie are on the
verge of war." 08 The consequences of the CAP were well-sum-
marized by D. Gale Johnson, the long-time University of Chi-
104. See id. at 115.
105. See id. at 116.
106. MILLING AND BAKING NEws, Mar. 1, 1983, at 9. See also Thomas J.
Schoenbaum, Agricultural Trade Wars: A Threat to the GATT and Global Free
Trade, ST. MARY'S L.J. 1165, 1170 (1993). The author notes:
The GATT panel concluded that EC wheat subsidies had indeed caused
'undue disturbance to normal United States commercial interest.' The
trade experts acknowledged that export subsidization had greatly in-
creased the EC's share of the world markets. Nevertheless, the Panel
refused to find that the EC undercut prices or used its subsidies to gain
more than an equitable share of the world market. The Panel reached
these contradictory conclusions because it could not agree on an appro-
priate base period for defining the EC's equitable share. Because the
United States failed to secure relief at the GATT, the United States
took retaliatory measures and instituted a wheat-flour export-subsidy
program of its own.
Id.
107. William H. Boger III, The United States-European Community Agricul-
tural Export Subsidies Dispute, 16 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 173, 222 (1984).
"The sale was a signal of U.S. displeasure with the EEC's export policy in gen-
eral, and showed a willingness on the part of the United States to match the
Community subsidy for subsidy in defense of overseas markets." Id.
108. MILLING AND BAKING NEWS, Mar. 22, 1983, at 67. See also McGeorge,
supra note 72, at 394 (describing the EC and the United States as "engaged in a
full-fledged agricultural trade war").
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cago farm market analyst: "the Common Market, instead of
being an importer, is pushing all the grain it can out of [the]
backdoor. None of it is good for the American farmer."' 0 9 Amer-
ican policymakers responded to the "EC's offensive" in 1985 with
an "offensive weapon" known as the Export Enhancement Pro-
gram (EEP), a subsidy system designed to regain American mar-
ket share in grain exports. 1" 0 According to the president of the
North American Export Grain Association, the "U.S.-EC subsidy
war" was waged in part to improve the American bargaining po-
sition in the GATT talks on agriculture."' The EEP, according
to United States Trade Representative Carla Hills, maintained
"the credible threat of retaliation."" 2
In sum, the EC created enormous problems for American
grain exporters. In the 1960s, the EC imported 15 million tons
of grain, but by the early 1980s, with the help of the CAP and
export subsidies, EC member-states were exporting 12 million
tons."13 Trade negotiations in recent years sought to control
this expensive and trade-distorting commercial rivalry by reduc-
ing export subsidies and eliminating import barriers. Addi-
109. Winston Williams, Farm Groups Skeptical on Grain Offer to Soviets,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1982, at D27.
110. Christopher Rusek, Trade Liberalization in Developed Countries: Move-
ment Toward Market Control of Agricultural Trade in the United States, Japan,
and the European Union, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 493, 499 (Fall 1996). The author
notes:
In 1985, the Export Enhancement Program (EEP) was introduced and
is the most important example of U.S. agricultural export policy. The
EEP lowers the price of U.S. agricultural products to specific overseas
markets in order to increase the U.S. share of world markets, espe-
cially in the case of wheat. The intention of this policy is to pressure
countries that subsidize agricultural exports to eliminate such trade-
distorting policies.
Id.
111. RONALD T. LIBBY, PROTECTING MARKETS: U.S. POLICY AND THE WORLD
GRAIN TRADE 26 (1992); McGeorge, supra note 72, at 393 (explaining that "[tihis
massive export subsidy program [EEP] was designed to meet the short-term
policy objective of enabling U.S. agricultural exporters to compete with subsi-
dized EEC exporters in world markets, and the longer term objective of forcing
the EEC to enter into serious negotiations to liberalize its agricultural trade
policies."). Despite increased leverage, squabbles over agriculture still
stretched the Uruguay Round of the GATT to eight years.
112. LIBBY, supra note 111, at 66.
113. See MILLING AND BAKING NEWS, Mar. 22, 1983, at 67. See also J. Kodwo
Bentil, Attempts to Liberalize International Trade in Agriculture and the Prob-
lem of the External Aspects of the Common Agricultural Policy of the European
Economic Community, CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 335, 336 (1985) (explaining how
the "EEC's CAP has undermined the international agricultural trade of various
non-EEC countries by a significant poaching of their traditional overseas
markets").
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tional state interference, whether through a wheat pooling plan
that subsidizes farmer participation or through other measures,
could undermine recent successes and revive simmering trade
disputes. The EU would likely rival the wheat pool, given the
EU's status as the world's largest producer of durum wheat and
as a frequent exporter. 114
F. THE RIsKS OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
The 1972 American grain sales to the Soviet Union further
exposed the pitfalls and complexity of the international agricul-
tural trade. 11 5 President Richard M. Nixon and his advisors be-
lieved that increased grain sales would strengthen the dollar,
reduce the mounting balance-of-payments deficit, address the
trade deficit (in 1971 the United States ran the first trade deficit
since 1888), pare down American commodity surpluses, and im-
prove superpower relations. 1" 6 He therefore agreed, in 1971, to
end the licensing requirement for grain exports to Russia and
China and the requirement that fifty percent of all shipments be
carried on American merchant marine vessels, a Kennedy ad-
ministration concession to induce the maritime unions to load
grain ships in the early 1960s. 117 In the summer of 1972, grain
companies funneled almost twelve million tons of grain to the
Soviet Union. l" 8 The sale ushered in a period of food shortages
that would end American export subsidies for wheat and even
prompt the government to prohibit the exportation of soybeans,
114. See Koo et al., supra note 5, at 13 (noting that EU durum wheat exports
have ranged between 11 and 123 million bushels per year).
115. See Ali, supra note 66, at 60 (explaining the instability created in inter-
national agricultural markets when the Soviet Union became an importer in
the early 1970s).
116. JAMES WESSEL, TRADING THE FUTURE 161 (1983). This article explains
that President Nixon was responding to international economic developments
that precipitated the conversion of American dollars into gold in the late sixties.
See id. In May 1971, four European countries revalued their money upward,
effectively ending the postwar Bretton Woods international monetary system
based on the American dollar. See id. In turn, "[tihe president unilaterally sus-
pended dollar convertibility into gold, effectively devaluing it, and instituted a
wage freeze, a tax surcharge on imports, and a series of measures to improve
U.S. export performance-with increased agricultural exports the center of this
strategy." Id. (italics added). See ROBERT PASTOR, CONGRESS AND THE POLITICS
OF U.S. FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY 1929-1976, at 138 (1990).
117. MORGAN, supra note 81, at 195 (noting that "The major difficulty in
expanding grain trade with the Russians was still the plum that Kennedy had
thrown out to the unions in 1963 in the form of a guarantee that American
ships would carry half the grain").
118. See id. at 207 (calling the sale "what quite likely was the largest grain
transaction in the history of the world").
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the only government action to impede American agricultural ex-
ports since World War II.119
When the world suffered food shortages in the 1970s, state
involvement in agricultural markets increased the possibility of
manipulating food stocks for geopolitical purposes. After de-
cades of disposing of American agricultural stockpiles on inter-
national markets despite the protests of allies, the United States
considered wielding "agripower" as a diplomatic weapon.120
With seventy-five percent of the world's grain exports as a diplo-
matic tool, President Nixon secured the SALT treaty in 1972
which, according to one author, directly "hinge[d]" on American
grain sales. 121
In 1972 and 1973, the pro-American regimes in South Viet-
nam and Cambodia received seventy percent of P.L. 480 food
aid.' 22 A Chilean food crisis exacerbated by a discontinuance of
American P.L. 480 aid, a suspension of grain sales and credit,
and American manipulation of international lending, among
other U.S. efforts to "destabilize" the Chilean government,
helped topple the Allende regime in 1973.123 Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger also employed American grain as a tool for bro-
kering Middle Eastern peace and, as a result, by 1978 Egypt be-
came the largest recipient of P.L. 480 aid.' 24 In 1975, the
119. See id. at 217; Herbert Stein, Food Prices: Oh, How It All Adds Up,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1972.
120. See William T. Weber, The Complexities of Agripower: A Review Essay,
52 AGRIC. HIST. 526-28 (1978).
121. SEYMOUR HERSH, THE PRICE OF POWER: KISSINGER IN THE NIXON WHITE
HOUSE 346 (1983). See also Howard Fineman, It's Dole Inc. vs. Clinton Inc.,
NEWSWEEK, Apr. 8, 1996, at 30 (explaining the continuing importance of agri-
culture in U.S-Russian relations). When Russia was threatening to ban im-
ports of American poultry President Clinton stepped in: "'This is a big issue,'
Clinton told Yeltsin, 'especially since 40% of U.S. poultry is produced in Arkan-
sas.'" Id. See also William Safire, The Russian Election, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8,
1996, at A15 (noting that "Mr. Clinton's incredible request made at the last
summit to refrain from putting tariffs on Arkansas chickens-a favor to the
Tyson lawyer whose commodity 'advice' enriched the Clintons by $100,000-
has been heatedly denied and graciously granted").
122. See MORGAN, supra note 81, at 338.
123. See id. at 338-39. The author states:
Chile provides the best example of a country where the American food
tap was turned off and on again in response to political developments.
Subsidized food shipments to Chile were stopped after the Marxist Sal-
vador Allende was elected president in 1970, and it was one of the first
forms of aid to resume after he was overthrown on September 11, 1973.
This was part of the covert tactics of 'destabilization' adopted by the
Nixon administration against Allende.
Id.
124. Id. at 341-42.
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United States also sought to use its "grain power" to convince
the Soviet Union to exchange ten million tons of oil at below-
OPEC prices for access to American grain stores. 125 Underscor-
ing the potential for government abuse of food stocks, former
Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz once recalled that "[mly
fiercest battles were with Henry Kissinger. He was always try-
ing to get his hands on food for a foreign policy tool." 126
The OPEC oil shocks, coupled with the economic instability
stemming from the collapse of the Breton Woods exchange sys-
tem, stagflation in the United States, and a greater awareness of
environmental damage and limits to economic growth, com-
pounded fears of a global resource war in the 1970s. 127 In 1974,
the National Strategy Information Center released a study enti-
tled Can We Avert Economic Warfare in Raw Materials? US Ag-
riculture as a Blue Chip, exploring the use of farm exports as an
economic lever. 128 An expanded version of the study argued
that the United States was in a prime position to extract conces-
sions from foreign powers because of its massive capacity to pro-
duce agricultural commodities and the limited production in
other countries. 129 The study highlighted the Soviet Union's
acute vulnerability to American food power. 130 After the foreign
policy setbacks of the 1970s-the fall of South Vietnam, Soviet
adventurism in Africa, the communist revolution in Nicaragua,
and the growth of powerful communist insurgencies throughout
Central America-the CIA believed that the "United States
might regain the primacy in world affairs it held in the immedi-
ate postwar period" by using food power.' 3 '
125. See id. at 334. See also ROBERT L. PAARLBERG, FOOD TRADE AND FOR-
EIGN POLICY: INDIA, THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE UNITED STATES 23 (1985) (not-
ing the potential power of U.S.-Canadian cooperation). "'[T]he food producers'
monopoly exceeds the oil producers' oil monopoly,' argued Assistant Secretary
of State Thomas 0. Enders in 1974. '[W]e could make OPEC look sick,' said
another State Department official at the time, 'if we were just to use what our
agriculture gives us.'" Id.
126. The Free Market's Biggest Fan; Earl Butz Still Loves Farmers and
Hates Controls, Top PRODUCER, Mid-March 1996, at 12; ROGER PORTER, THE
U.S.-U.S.S.R. GRAIN AGREEMENT 44, 67, 104 (1984). See also JOAN HOFF, NIXON
RECONSIDERED 204 (1994) (noting the "competition from Butz and Kissinger
over who was in charge of making food aid a more integrated part of American
diplomacy").
127. See WILLIAM SCHNEIDER, FOOD, FOREIGN POLICY, AND RAW MATERIALS
CARTELS vii (1976).
128. Id. at ix.
129. See id. at 20-38.
130. See id. at 57.
131. Emma Rothschild, Food Politics, 54 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 285, 294 (1976)
(quoting the CIA).
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The use of grain embargoes in the 1970s accented the dan-
gers and futility of government interference in agricultural mar-
kets and angered many American farmers. 132 During the
American grain embargo against the Soviet Union, for example,
the Soviets simply found other sources of supply. 133 Similar
state-sponsored agricultural market manipulation resulted from
recent nuclear tests in India and Pakistan.134 Farmers subse-
quently protested and voiced their legitimate fears of state inter-
ference in the grain trade, an attitude that weakens the chances
of a successful wheat pool. Farm groups are currently attempt-
ing to end all state interference in the grain trade and to discon-
tinue the embargoes on rogue states such as Iran, Iraq, North
Korea, Sudan, and Cuba.135 In addition to its unpopularity
among export-dependant farmers, state manipulation of inter-
national food markets is particularly alarming to nations strug-
gling to feed their people. 13 6 The world's poor pay the greatest
price when governments restrain the ability of farmers to mar-
ket their food.' 37
132. See Lowell D. Hill, Effects ofRegulation on Efficiency of Grain Market-
ing, 17 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 389, 393 (1985).
133. See id.
134. See Sanctions Bedevil America's Farmers, ABERDEEN AM. NEWS (S.D.),
June 7, 1998, at 2C. The author notes:
The nuclear devices India and Pakistan detonated reverberated
through American agriculture as farmers once again faced potential
lost markets because the United States was imposing economic sanc-
tions for political reasons. Many remembered all too well the harmful
impact of 1980's grain embargo on the Soviet Union, intended as pun-
ishment for the invasion of Afghanistan, which cost U.S. farmers as
estimated $2.3 billion in lost exports and has had a lasting legacy
abroad.
Id. See generally, U.S. Firms Bristle at Cost of Trade Sanctions, DES MOINES
REG., July 2, 1997, at 10 (noting farmer anger at government interference in
agricultural exports).
135. See Craig Urges U.S. Crop Sale to Iran, IDAHO STATESMAN, Dec. 17,
1998, at 11A (describing the push by former state lawmakers to end state re-
strictions on the wheat trade, which limits the access of American producers to
11% of the world's market).
136. See McGeorge, supra note 72, at 400-08 (noting the impact of agricul-
tural trade disruptions on countries with non-subsistence levels of agricultural
output).
137. See generally, Jonathan Carlson, Hunger, Agricultural Trade Liberali-
zation, and Soft International Law: Addressing the Legal Dimensions of a Polit-
ical Problem, 70 IOWA L. REV. 1187, 1218-20 (explaining how agricultural trade
liberalization could help less developed countries enhance food security);
Charles House, Author Says Millions in China Still Go Hungry, FEEDSTUFFS,
Jan. 4, 1999, at 22 (noting Chinese reluctance to rely on the world agricultural
trade, despite food shortages). "'They can't afford to trust hostile foreign powers
for their food,' he said. 'Food is always a strategic weapon in their minds.'" Id.
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G. THE URUGUAY HOPES
Agriculture was the greatest obstacle to reaching a final
agreement during the Uruguay Round, prolonging the negotia-
tions for seven years. 138 When an agreement was finally
reached, it was hailed as the Round's greatest accomplish-
ment. 139 The Agreement on Agriculture included provisions for
scaling back export subsidies and domestic support programs
and guaranteed greater market access for imported products. 140
Although the achievement seemed momentous, some commenta-
tors reserved judgment in light of the historic difficulties of lib-
eralizing the agricultural trade, but still acknowledged that a
framework with the potential to foster wide-ranging reforms
had been established. 141
The Agreement requires the tariffication of non-tariff border
measures. 142 This process enables the level of agricultural pro-
tection to be quantified in a way that is conducive to reducing
such protection during future trade negotiations. The effective-
ness of such an arrangement is evident in the agreement itself:
once tariffication occurs, tariff levels are to be reduced, on aver-
age, by thirty-six percent over six years for developed coun-
tries. 143 Also, after the end of six years, imports are guaranteed
at least five percent of domestic markets.'4 Should tariffication
create greater protection than previous non-tariff barriers, mar-
ket access will be protected by the requirement that neither the
percentage nor the quantity of imports fall below 1986-1988
levels. 145
The Agreement also requires that domestic support be re-
duced twenty percent over six years. 146 Support levels are to be
calculated using the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS). 147
Of particular relevance to the North Dakota wheat pooling plan,
138. See Strating, supra note 48, at 305 (noting that "Among the fifteen dif-
ferent negotiating groups, the agricultural trade group was considered not only
the most important, but also the most contentious").
139. See McGeorge supra note 72, at 382 (noting the Uruguay Round dead-
lock over agriculture, as late as the summer of 1992, between the United States,
the Cairns Group [a group of nations promoting free trade], the EEC, and
Japan).
140. See Agreement, supra note 9.
141. See Steinle, supra note 51, at 333.
142. See Agreement, supra note 9, art. 4:2.
143. See Steinle, supra note 51, at 346.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 352.
147. See Agreement, supra note 9, art. 6:1.
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the Agreement stipulates that state and local government sup-
port be included in the calculation of the AMS. 148
The Agreement also addresses the problem of export subsi-
dies for farm products, an issue that has bedeviled GATT since
its inception. 149 Countries are required to reduce their spending
on export subsidies by thirty-six percent and the volume of sub-
sidized exports by twenty-one percent over six years. 150 Fur-
ther, countries are prohibited from creating new export
subsidies on currently subsidized products and cannot imple-
ment new subsidies for products which were unsubsidized be-
tween 1986-1988.151 The agreement defines "export subsidy"15 2
to include a wide range of activities, potentially bringing the
wheat pooling proposal into conflict with the subsidy reduction
requirement.
II. THE CHALLENGES FACING THE POOLING PLAN
A. THE NORTH DAKOTA FARMERS UNION WHEAT POOLING
PLAN
In late summer of 1998, in the midst of extremely low prices
for agricultural products, the President of the North Dakota
Farmers Union (NDFU) announced a plan to raise farm income
through the pooling of wheat, particularly durum and hard red
spring (HRS) wheat. By pooling their products to build market
power, farmers hoped to "bargain with buyers for a better
price."1 53 The proposal includes potential collaboration with the
Canadian Wheat Board in the selling of wheat. 54 The NDFU
feels that "[ilf we can reach an agreement with them, we will
eliminate a competitor and be able to obtain a higher price for
wheat and durum on both sides of the border." 55 The state-
owned North Dakota Mill and Elevator would administer the
148. See id. at Annex 3:3. "Support at both the national and sub-national
level shall be included." Id.
149. The Tokyo Round of the GATT, 1974-1979, did attempt to toughen re-
strictions on subsidies, but the resulting Code on Subsidies and Countervailing
Duties did not apply to agricultural subsidies. See Filapek, supra note 47, at
138-39. "[Tlhe Subsidies Code has been plagued with interpretive difficulties.
Moreover, it has failed to stem the massive use of production and export subsi-
dies for agricultural products." Id.
150. See Agreement, supra note 9, art. 9:2(b)(iv).
151. See id. at art. 8 and art. 3:3.
152. See id. at art. 9:1.
153. Dakota Pride Pool, proposal presented by Robert Carlson, North Da-
kota Farmers Union President, Press Conference, Aug. 4, 1998.
154. See id.
155. Id.
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program by "acquir[ing] marketing rights" over North Dakota
wheat.156 To encourage farmers to join the pool, farmers would
be given an "incentive payment" of $1 per bushel for their first
year of participation and $.50 per bushel for the second year.157
After the first two years, the NDFU assumes the program "will
be on its feet."' 58 Given the history of similar efforts in the past,
however, the wheat pooling proposal faces a number of potential
challenges.
B. THE MARKET COORDINATION PROBLEM
In order for the wheat pool to generate income for farmers,
commodity prices must be higher than total production costs.
The volatility of global agricultural markets makes this very dif-
ficult.' 59 If it were not, farmers would not need state interven-
tion. When prices fall, the wheat pool will need to rely on
additional funding from the North Dakota Treasury. The state's
modest budget and sparse population make this unlikely. 60
If the pooling effort increases wheat prices, other nations
could retaliate, embracing methods reminiscent of Herbert Hoo-
ver's anti-cartel campaigns of the 1920s.161 Foreign nations, for
example, could build buying pools to counter the power of the
wheat pool, eliminating any advantage a large wheat pool would
have over smaller and more disorganized buyers. 162 Foreign na-
tions could also attempt to grow wheat themselves, much like
156. Id.
157. See id.
158. Carlson unveils initiative to form ND wheat marketing pool, NDFU
Press Release, July 28, 1998.
159. See IMF Called Vital to U.S. Agricultural Interests, OMAHA WORLD-
HERALD, Mar. 19, 1998, at 20 (noting that this is particularly true, given the
costs of the current Asian crisis, since over 40 percent of American exports go to
Asia).
160. See Koo et al, supra note 5, at 62 (noting costs to the state of North
Dakota). See also Don't Count on Rush to Set Up Wheat Pool, ABERDEEN AM.
NEWS, Aug. 10, 1998, at 5A (estimating that "[sitate payments to farmers who
participate in the pool could run into the hundreds of millions of dollars").
161. See O'Connor, supra note 39, at 261 (explaining that the similar plan of
a wheat exporting cartel would be "weakened since individually, cartel mem-
bers could be faced with significant repercussions in the form of retaliatory
trade restrictions imposed by resentful importers")
162. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The International Trade Laws and the
New Protectionism: The Need for a Synthesis with Antitrust, 19 N.C. IN'L L. &
COM. REG. 393, 419 (explaining how Japanese wood chip importers conspired to
lower prices to counter a coordinated exporting effort on the part of American
exporters).
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Hoover's efforts to foster the development of rubber tree planta-
tions to counter the Stevenson rubber cartel.163
While the climatic conditions necessary for growing wheat
would limit such an enterprise, the potential exists for ex-
panding the world wheat acreage by changing current crop pro-
duction patterns or through the tilling of new ground amenable
to wheat production.164 In the case of Durum wheat, North Da-
kota only produces twenty-five percent of the North American
supply and 6.3 percent of the world's supply, indicating the
existence of other suppliers who would be willing to enter a prof-
itable market.' 65 Durum wheat production also has shown the
capacity to shift to new areas of the United States, a prospect
that undermines the ability of the proposed pool to boost prices
by maintaining a large market share.166 Additionally, certain
areas have proven to have the capacity to increase or decrease
163. See Brandes, supra note 25, at 198-99. Brandes notes:
By March 1923, Congress had responded to Hoover's calls for a 'Na-
tional Defense against this price control' with a half-million-dollar ap-
propriation to finance both a world-wide search for alternative sources
and rubber-producing experiments within the Western Hemisphere ...
The ensuing survey explored investment opportunities and generated
debates over the virtues of growing rubber in the Philippines-under
the American flag-as compared to new Latin American plantations.
[Harvey] Firestone's ambitions in Liberia were also encouraged...
Before the Rubber Survey ended, Department of Commerce agents had
been sent to the tropical wilderness of Central America, the Philip-
pines, Ecuador, and the bargaining tables of London and The Hague.
Id.
164. See Koo et al, supra note 5, at 63 (explaining how price increases could
induce production in the United States alone).
[A] 10 percent increase in the price of durum wheat would induce
about the same percentage increase in supply. If the pool were to raise
the domestic price of durum by 30 percent (e.g., from $4.00/bushel to
$5.20/bushel), the domestic supply of durum wheat would increase by
30 percent. To the extent that additional production is supplied by free
riders, this will weaken the market power of the pool.
Id.
165. See Won W. Koo et al., Economic Analysis of the Proposed North Dakota
Wheat Pool: Prepared for North Dakota Industrial Commission 21-22 (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with the Department of Agricultural Economics,
Northern Plains Trade and Policy Research Center, North Dakota State
University).
166. See id. at 19-24 (explaining the movement of durum wheat production
from Eastern North Dakota, South Dakota, and Minnesota to Western North
Dakota and Eastern Montana). See also Farmers Begin Planting New Crop in
Kansas; State Plans Shift to White Wheat, DES MOINES REG., Jan. 24, 1999, at 5
(explaining how "Kansas has been preparing for years to make the shift to hard
white wheat - which is increasingly preferred in the global marketplace, partic-
ularly in Asia").
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durum wheat production in response to market conditions. 167
The prospects of an HRS wheat pool are even slimmer because of
North Dakota's much smaller market share 168 and the availabil-
ity of other varieties of wheat which can be substituted for HRS
when prices increase. 169 The prospect of additional wheat acre-
age is directly proportional to the success of the wheat pooling
plan: the more prices rise, the greater the likelihood that other
nations will expand wheat production to take advantage of the
price increase and avoid paying higher wheat prices. 170
Other possible consequences of the wheat pool include con-
sumer boycotts or product substitution.17 1 The American beef
industry, which has suffered as consumers embraced substitutes
such as chicken and fish, provides an apt precedent for such an
167. See Koo et al., supra note 165, at 26.
Arizona and California raise durum wheat under irrigation. During
the past 12 years the planted acres in Arizona varied between 38 and
165 thousand acres, while planted acres in California varied between
55 and 140 thousand acres. Planted acres in the southwest region are
very responsive to durum price changes .... The western states of
Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, and Nevada irrigate 323 thou-
sand acres of spring wheat. Some of this irrigated land could be used
to grow durum wheat.
Id.
168. See id. at 8, 19. North Dakota only produces 50 percent of HRS wheat
in the United States compared to 88 percent of durum wheat. See id.
169. See id. at 85.
Unlike durum wheat, HRS wheat is substitutable with hard red winter
wheat. HRS wheat represents about 30 percent of the U.S. hard wheat
production. Domestic demand for HRS wheat is very sensitive to the
price of HRS wheat (price-elastic), while demand for durum wheat is
much less sensitive to the price of durum (price-inelastic).
Id.
170. See Koo et al., supra note 5, at 61 (noting that"Since Canada can in-
crease its exports to the United States in response to a price increase, the pool's
market share may shrink in absence of some form of cooperation with Can-
ada."). See also Ali, supra note 66, at 59 (noting that "wheat is produced in
most countries of the world.").
171. See O'Connor, supra note 39, at 259-60 (describing the difficulties of a
cartel among the major wheat exporting countries.)
Political and farm leaders in both the United States and Canada have
seriously considered this possibility. Under such a plan, the producer
countries would form a commodity cartel to control the supply and de-
mand of wheat. In the short run, a wheat cartel would probably in-
crease export revenues of the exporting nations. However, this result
would depend on their political will to form and maintain a cartel ar-
rangement. In order for a commodity cartel to be successful, both sup-
ply and demand must be relatively price inelastic. Without such
inelasticity, an increase in price could result in either a consumer boy-
cott, consumer substitution of another product, or an increase in pro-
duction by new or current producers.
Id. (italics added).
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outcome. 172 This outcome is possible in Asia, for example,
where consumers could revert to their historical preference for
rice, undermining previous efforts of wheat exporters to build
international demand for wheat in regions where demand has
typically been low.17 3 This possible consequence is more likely
given the current Asian economic crisis, which could be exacer-
bated by policy initiatives undermining trade liberalization, fur-
ther depressing an export market critical to American
producers. 174
The experiences of the International Wheat Agreements of
the middle decades of this century also illustrate the problem of
coordinating global agricultural markets with other nations.
Canada could repudiate the agreement, sell wheat for whatever
price it wishes and undermine the pool, much like the nations
who left the International Wheat Agreements after making a
commitment to cooperate.' 75 Ample precedent also exists for
172. See Jon K. Lauck, Competition in the Grain Belt Meatpacking Sector
after World War 11, 57 ANNALS OF IOWA 135, 142-43 (Spring 1998).
The inflation of the early 1970s, which produced food price increases of
as much as 15 percent in 1973 alone, also triggered protests, boycotts,
and the organization of a broad consumer movement that was quick to
criticize what its supporters viewed as high food prices and to urge
consumers to substitute other products for meat.
Id.
173. See Ali, supra note 66, at 62 (noting that Chinese consumption of wheat
doubled in the 1970s).
174. See Agricultural Trade Can Help Recovery, NEw STRAITs TIMES, Nov.
15, 1998, at 5. See also Bill Barret, Devastating Year in the Heartland (letter to
editor), WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 1998, at A15 (noting that in 1997 and 1998 "produ-
cers of wheat, corn, feedgrains and upland cotton lost more than 20% in com-
modity export sales from Asia alone."); Koo et al., supra note 5, at 2 (noting
that China has been the largest importer of common wheat during the past
seven years and that Japan has also been a significant importer); Bob Davis,
U.S. Brings Mixed Message to Asia Forum, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1998, at A2
(noting the already muddled message sent to Asian leaders by the Clinton ad-
ministration: "Boost your ailing economies through trade liberalization, but
don't export so much that it hurts U.S. companies and their workers").
175. See Koo et al., supra note 5, at 60 (explaining the importance of cooper-
ation with Canada).
The success of the pool depends upon its market share in the United
States and the extent of potential cooperation with the CWB [Cana-
dian Wheat Board]. Without full cooperation from the CWB, the pro-
posed ND wheat pools may not be able to raise domestic prices. Millers
in the United States will buy wheat from Canada if the pool attempts
to raise its domestic price without such cooperation. In general, the
pool is unlikely to exert much market power if its market is less than
50 percent.
Id.; Brandes, supra note 25, at 199 (explaining that a key weakness of the Ste-
venson rubber cartel was the absence of a key producer). "In spite of official
British pleas for cooperation with their restriction scheme, the Dutch producers
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nationalistic rivalry similar to the competition between the
American P.L. 480 and Export Enhancement Programs and the
export subsidy programs of the European Union. 176 Since the
Canadian Wheat Board commands more resources than the
North Dakota State Mill and Elevator, it is better equipped to
withstand a price war between the two bodies. With a larger
financial endowment and the numerous experiential advantages
a more established state-trading institution possesses, the Ca-
nadian Wheat Board could attempt to exhaust the financial ca-
pacity of the North Dakota wheat pool. 177 An initiative
premised on international cooperation could degenerate into a
prolonged trade war subsidized by sub-national and national
governments, reversing the trend toward liberalization.1 7 8
C. AGAINST THE GRAIN
As discussed previously, the Agreement on Agriculture
reached during the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations inter-
rupted the long history of state interference in global agricul-
tural markets. 179 The North Dakota wheat pooling proposal
runs counter to the Agreement's effort to roll back export subsi-
dies and state intervention in agricultural markets. 80 Most
remained outside the system, and their decision to compete made the Stevenson
plan less effective." Id.
176. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
177. See Wheeler, supra note 1, at 384 (noting that the organization of the
Canadian Wheat Board came after cooperatives, a central feature of the North
Dakota plan, proved too weak to accomplish their task).
For many years attempts were made in Canada, under both provincial
and federal legislation, to organize co-operatives for the marketing of
grain with a view to securing control over a sufficient part of the supply
to enable them to obtain adequate returns to the producers. These at-
tempts were not successful in the face of the price deflation of the late
twenties and early thirties and, in 1935, the Government of Canada
established the Canadian Wheat Board.
Id. See also McCalla and Schmitz, supra note 80, at 204 (also explaining that
the CWB grew out of cooperatives, which were aided by subnational govern-
ments, such as the Alberta Wheat Pool, Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, and Mani-
toba Pool Elevators).
178. See generally, Frieder Roessler, Domestic Policy Objectives and the
Multilateral Trade Order: Lessons from the Past, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 513
(advancing the general principle that linking trade and domestic policy con-
cerns, in the present case to bolster the economic security of farmers, under-
mines the global trading regime).
179. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
180. See Eva Rook Basile, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), the European Economic Community (EC), and Agriculture, 28 TULSA
L.J. 741, 742 (1993) (noting that "the idea of prohibiting or reducing both export
subsidies and domestic subsidies has found popular support"). See also Terence
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farm groups, in contrast to the North Dakota Farmers Union,
have fully endorsed the trend toward liberalization in export
markets and have organized their support through a lobbying
effort known as "Ag for Fast Track," a coalition of sixty-eight ag-
ricultural groups.' 8 ' In addition, the pooling plan conflicts with
the agenda set for the 1999 WTO negotiations, which are sched-
uled to examine methods for reducing state-trading in agricul-
ture.'8 2 The Farmers Union pooling proposal may represent
another lonely dissent from the foreign economic policy views of
other major agricultural groups.' 8 3
J. Centner, The Internationalization of Agriculture: Preparing for the Twenty-
First Century, 73 NEB. L. REV. 5, 6-7 (1994)(lamenting the continued doubts
about fur trade among some farm groups).
181. See Trade Policy: U.S. Agricultural Coalition Wants Comprehensive
Fast-Track Authority, INT'L TRADE REP., Nov. 26, 1997. See also Bill Houd,
Yeutter Pushes Fast Track Bill for Ag, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Sept. 4, 1998
(quoting former Secretary of Agriculture Clayton Yeutter criticizing the failure
to pass a fast-track law in preparation for the 1999 agriculture negotiations);
Anthau George, Falling Prices Put More Pressure on Fast-Track Talks, DES
MOINES REG., Aug. 30, 1998 (explaining that "[m]ost agricultural and agribusi-
ness interests increasingly see trade liberalization as an economic life-and-
death issue, as crop output has increased by 3 percent to 4 percent a year, while
domestic demand increases 1 percent to 2 percent annually."); U.S. Fears Back-
sliding on Farm Trade, THE FIN. POST, Mar. 3, 1998 (noting Secretary of Agri-
culture Dan Glickman's fear of "backsliding" on agricultural trade liberalization
and his announcement to "continue the push toward elimination of subsidies,
and tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers" at the 1999 negotiations on agricul-
ture); Thomas Friedman, Heartland Geopolitics, N.Y.TIMES, May 1, 1996, at
A13 (quoting former Minnesota Governor Arne Carlson referring to the failure
of Pat Buchanan's anti-free trade message in farm states).
The problem with Buchanan is that he did get his message out, and
there was a very quiet 'no' vote. Dole swept North Dakota, South Da-
kota and Minnesota. What you had here was a quiet understanding on
the part of farmers that they benefited from free trade. They want
open, competitive relationships on the world market and while there
might be some dissatisfaction with the question of equity, they were
not willing to buy into the closed-door theory of Buchanan.
Id.
182. See G. Chandler Keys, III, submission to House Committee on Agricul-
ture, July 22, 1998 (noting that at the 1999 meetings leaders will "[n]egotiate
elimination of State Trading Entities (STEs) and increase access to wholesale
and retail trade in importing countries (especially relevant in China, but this
issue also applies to the Australian and Canadian Wheat Boards"). See also
Prairie Rebels; Ottawa Cracks Down on Wheat Smugglers, MACLEAN'S, Oct. 10,
1994 (indicating growing discontent among Canadian farmers with the Cana-
dian Wheat Board). "Under law, prairie farmers must export their wheat
through the Canadian Wheat Board. But hundreds of them have been hauling
grain illegally to the United States, where they can earn more than twice as
much. And the revolt is spreading." Id.
183. See generally, BRUCE FIELD, HARVEST OF DISSENT: THE NATIONAL FARM-
ERS UNION AND THE EARLY COLD WAR 9-28 (1998)(outlining the historic differ-
ence between the Farmers Union and other farm groups).
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Contrary to the wheat pooling plan, many members of the
agricultural policy community, as well as important agricultural
interests, have urged greater liberalization of global agricultural
markets.' 8 4 The productivity of American farmers creates enor-
mous opportunities for expanding agricultural sales in a free
trading world.'l 5 This rationale explains American efforts to
halt the Common Agricultural Policy in the 1960s. It also ex-
plains the very ambitious liberalization agenda advanced by the
United States prior to the beginning of the Uruguay Round ne-
gotiations in the mid-1980s. l 86 Since many farm groups hope to
continue this trend during the upcoming WTO talks on agricul-
ture, the wheat pooling proposal is working against the grain.18
7
Other farm groups may be hostile to proposals that undermine
the limited progress made toward greater trade liberalization,
especially given the heightened tension over the current banana
dispute, which threatens the WTO dispute settlement sys-
184. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
185. See Rusek, supra note 110, at 511.
Many American producers of wheat, corn and soybeans for example,
are low-cost producers in the world market whose products are fully
competitive with other unsubsidized producers in the world. If multi-
lateral agricultural reform led to the elimination of export subsidies
worldwide, the markets for U.S. products should expand as the compe-
tition from highly subsidized producers in other countries disappeared.
Thus, at least some U.S. farmers would have a strong incentive to sup-
port global agricultural reform.
Id. See also Charles Johnson, The Free Trader Fires Away: American Agricul-
ture Can Deregulate Itself into World Dominance, Ed Schuh Thinks, FARM J.,
Nov. 1995, at 20D (quoting agricultural economist Ed Schuh). "If we let it, for-
eign demand will sustain us. As per capita incomes rise, people tend to upgrade
their diets to livestock and livestock products. The demand for feed grains
grows apace, and demonstrably this is one sector in which producers in this
country have a comparative advantage." Id.
186. See Filapek, supra note 47, at 148 (commenting before the end of the
Uruguay Round).
The United States proposal for agricultural negotiations represents
the most unambiguously liberal approach to trade of any proposal
before the Agriculture Group. It marks the culmination of the United
States' shift to market-based, export-oriented agricultural policies over
the past two-decades. The proposal thus reflects both the economic
ideology of the Reagan administration and the export interests of the
United States.
Id.
187. See Testimony of Janet A. Nuzum on behalf of the International Dairy
Foods Association before the House Committee on Agriculture Regarding the
Upcoming WTO Negotiations on Agriculture and Trade in the Western Hemi-
sphere, July 22, 1998. "In the upcoming round of agricultural negotiations, the
highest priority should be achieving the complete elimination of all agricultural
export subsidies, and substantial improvements in market access through both
expansion of tariff-rate quotas and reduction of tariffs" (italics added). Id.
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tem.' 88 During recent trade battles with Canada, Secretary of
Agriculture Dan Glickman was quick to emphasize the risks of
protectionism, noting that "[e]ven with the current downturn in
exports, the fact is that in the past year, we still exported about
$17 billion more in agriculture products than we imported.' 8 9
As a general principle, state-level intervention in foreign eco-
nomic policy can potentially undermine national efforts to nego-
tiate free trading arrangements perceived as beneficial by many
farmers. 190
Changes in domestic agricultural support programs are also
an important part of the liberalization trend. In 1996, Congress
passed the "Freedom to Farm Act,"' 91 which was hailed as re-
versing government interference in agriculture dating back to
the Great Depression. 192 While the long-term consequences of
the legislation are unclear, and despite emergency legislation in
1998 to aid farmers hit hard by falling prices, the Freedom to
188. See Fight Over Banana Trade Escalates, NAT'L L. J., Nov. 30, 1998, at
A14 (explaining that the banana controversy is "the first WTO case in which
compliance with a panel decision is disputed. Diplomats say it demonstrates
the shortcomings of the world trade regulator's new dispute settlement sys-
tem."). See also Kevin Whiteland, Banana-Trade Split; A Clash Between the
U.S. and Europe May Ultimately Define the Power of the WTO, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Jan. 11, 1999, at 49 (calling the dispute the "most serious chal-
lenge yet to the World Trade Organization's three-year process for resolving
trade disputes."); Ed Maixner, Efforts Launched to Help Pork Producers, FEED-
sTUFFs, Dec. 21, 1998, 1 at 3.
Last week 40 senators joined Sen. Bob Kerrey (D., Neb.) and Sen. John
Ashcroft (R., Mo.) in a letter to U.S. Trade Representative Charlene
Barshefsky asking that the U.S. use pork import tariffs as a retaliation
against the European Union in its refusal to abide by World Trade Or-
ganization rulings on Europe's banana importing regime.
Id. But see Guy de Jonquieres and Frances Williams, US Nears Truce with
Europe Over Bananas, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 23/Jan. 24 1999, at 1 (outlining efforts
by the head of the WTO designed to "stop the conflict [from] escalating into a
damaging trade war.").
189. Robert S. Greenberger, U.S.-Canada Farm-Trade Pact Leaves
Problems Requiring Much Longer to Solve, WALL ST. J., December 7, 1998, at
A2.
190. See Brenda S. Beerman, State Involvement in the Promotion of Export
Trade: Is It Time to Rethink the Concept of Federalism as It Pertains to Foreign
Relations? 21 N.C. J. INrr'L & COM. REG., 187, 199 (1995) (explaining how state
export promotion programs "might impede otherwise coherent and unified fed-
eral policy and undermine the credibility of the federal government's negotiat-
ing posture regarding specific foreign policies" but also noting potential positive
effects).
191. Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-127, 110 Stat. 888 (1996).
192. See Neil D. Hamilton, Plowing New Ground: Emerging Policy Issues in
a Changing Agriculture, 2 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 181, 190 (1997).
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Farm Act represents a Congressional bias against further gov-
ernment involvement in agricultural markets. 193 The legisla-
tion is specifically linked to greater efforts on the part of the
federal government to promote free trade and agricultural
exports. 194
D. POTENTIAL GATT CONFLICTS
The degree of government intervention in past decades
would have made the North Dakota wheat pool largely uncon-
troversial, at least as far as GATT was concerned. As it stands,
in light of the continuing trend toward liberalization in interna-
tional agricultural markets and the Uruguay Round's Agree-
ment on Agriculture, the wheat pool proposal generates
concerns about potential conflicts with international trading
rules. Although interference in international trade is often dis-
cussed in terms of national governments, state governments can
also disrupt trade flows. 19 5 In the event that state activities are
incompatible with trading rules, national governments can act:
"It is well settled that the federal government can legally pre-
empt state laws that are inconsistent with international trade
agreements."' 96
The wheat pool's greatest potential conflict stems from the
subsidy articles of the recent Agreement on Agriculture. Article
9:1(a) includes in its definition of subsidization "the provision by
193. See James Bovard, Farmers Harvest Bumper Crop in Beltway, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 21, 1998. See also GOP Says Trade is Key to Restoring Farm Health,
ABERDEEN AM. NEWS (S.D.), June 19, 1998 (listing Republican priorities as fast-
track authority and bailing out the IMF to help Asian economies which buy
American farm products); Farm Income Slides as Exports Slacken, MILWAUKEE
J. SENTINEL, July 5, 1998 (quoting farm analyst's argument that "[o]ne medio-
cre year won't spur Congress to reverse the laisse-faire direction of farm pol-
icy."); Spending Bill Boosts Farm Aid, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Oct. 15, 1998
(noting that the emergency bill to aid farmers did not include a widely promoted
provision to raise program support levels, thus leaving in place one of the main
provisions of the Freedom to Farm legislation). See also Norman Jane, Farm
Aid to be Transition Payments, DES MoINEs REG., Oct. 20, 1998 (noting that
"Republicans wanted [the emergency bill] delivered in transition payments,
which would require no alteration of the Freedom to Farm Act").
194. See Barrett, supra note 174, at A15. "One of the underlying premises of
the 1996 Freedom to Farm Act was concurrence from the Clinton Administra-
tion that a strong export trade policy was imperative to the success of the new
farm bill." Id.
195. See generally Beerman, supra note 190, at 199 (discussing how state
governments may hinder federal policy).
196. Kenneth Cooper, Note, To Compel or Encourage: Seeking Compliance
with International Trade Agreements at the State Level, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 143, 143 (1993).
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governments or their agencies of direct subsidies, including pay-
ments-in-kind, to a firm, to an industry, to producers of a prod-
uct, to a cooperative or other association of such producers, or to
a marketing board, contingent on export performance. ' 197 The
wheat pool plan may fit within this definition, as the plan would
be authorized by the state-run North Dakota Industrial Com-
mission and implemented by the North Dakota State Mill and
Elevator. Moreover, opponents of the wheat pool could argue
that the "incentive payments" made to farmers to encourage
membership in the pool constitute subsidies under the Agree-
ment, potentially creating an international trade dispute.
The Agreement specifically designates cooperatives as a ve-
hicle for subsidization,' 98 creating another potential trade con-
flict since pool members are required to "become members of a
Cooperative Marketing Association."' 99 The formation of the co-
operative, which would act "as a conduit for the state to market
the producer's wheat by using the ND State Mill and Elevator as
the broker," also increases the likelihood of conflict. 200 Article
9: 1(d) extends the coverage of the Agreement to include "the pro-
vision of subsidies to reduce the costs of marketing exports of
agricultural products," including "handling," an activity closely
linked to serving as a "conduit."201 In addition, since advocates
of the North Dakota wheat pool have openly embraced the model
of the Canadian Wheat Board, which involves a large degree of
government coordination, the risks of GATT-conflict seem
greater.20 2 Since the problem of state-trading entities such as
the Canadian Wheat Board is high on the agenda of the upcom-
ing WTO agricultural talks, future GATT complication is likely.
At the minimum, such an agenda indicates a growing hostility
toward such entities within the WTO.
197. Agreement, supra note 9, at art. 9:1(a) (emphasis added).
198. See North Dakota Farmers Union News Release, Aug. 4, 1998.
199. Agreement, supra note 9, at art. 9:1(a).
200. Dakota Pride Pool, Aug. 4, 1998 (emphasis added).
201. Brian Rustebakke, ND Wheat Pool Plan Has Drawbacks for Growers,
GRAND FoRKs HERALD, Aug. 6, 1998. "Under NDFU's proposal, the North Da-
kota Mill and Elevator would shoulder the majority of the pool's grain market-
ing burden. The state mill currently does not operate its own marketing arm -
an asset it would need to acquire to be part of the plan." Id.
202. See Koo et al, supra note 5, at 36. This article explains that the past
success of the Canadian Wheat Board included "the three pillars of single-desk
selling, government association, and risk management through pooling, self-in-
surance and government underwriting. These are net benefits after accounting
for costs related to CWB [Canadian Wheat Board] operations and taxpayer
costs of government association.") (emphasis added). Id.
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While the Agreement on Agriculture does not require the
abolition of these forms of subsidy, they are to be counted as part
of the overall level of subsidies subject to reduction over the six-
year period established in the Agreement. Even if the wheat
pool were not deemed a form of subsidy, it could be viewed as a
domestic support program scheduled to be scaled back in coming
years. The calculation of support levels using the AMS includes
"Is]upport at both the national and sub-national level," which
would seem to include the activities of the State of North Da-
kota.20 3 The wheat pooling plan could thus directly conflict with
current GATT agricultural arrangements, triggering an interna-
tional trade dispute when many farm groups are attempting to
liberalize the agricultural trade and avoid controversies which
could roll back the modest progress made in recent years.
III. CONCLUSION
The wheat pooling proposal advanced by the North Dakota
Farmers Union to relieve economic distress among farmers faces
several challenges. The degree of market coordination required
for such a plan to work has historically proven to be difficult.
The international rivalries fostered by past government inter-
vention have also tended to exacerbate and prolong agricultural
trade disputes. Since these trade disputes are disproportion-
ately costly to export-dependant American farmers, many Amer-
ican farm groups have promoted less government interference in
agricultural markets, making the policy environment for a state-
sponsored wheat pool less than optimal. Moreover, the trend
within the international trading system is to reduce barriers to
agricultural trade, a trend expected to continue when interna-
tional trade negotiations resume next year. Potential conflicts
between the wheat pooling proposal and current international
trade agreements also make the plan's ultimate success less
likely. The search for solutions to the economic distress faced by
many farmers should thus move beyond the wheat pooling plan.
203. Agreement, supra note 9, at Annex 3:3.
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